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objective. To evaluate the effectiveness of a rigorous search and destroy policy for controlling methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) infection or colonization.
design. Hospital-based observational follow-up study.
setting. Erasmus University Medical Center Rotterdam, a 1,200-bed tertiary care center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands.
methods. Outbreak control was accomplished by the use of active surveillance cultures for persons at risk, by the preemptive isolation
of patients at risk, and by the strict isolation of known MRSA carriers and the eradication of MRSA carriage. For unexpected cases of
MRSA colonization or infection, patients placed in strict isolation or contact isolation and healthcare workers (HCWs) were screened. We
collected data from 2000–2004.
results. During the 5-year study period, 51,907 MRSA screening cultures were performed for 21,598 persons at risk (8,403 patients
and 13,195 HCWs). By screening, it was determined that 123 (1.5%) of 8,403 patients and 31 (0.2%) of 13,195 HCWs were MRSA carriers.
From the performance of clinical cultures, it was determined that 54 additional patients were MRSA carriers, resulting in a total of 177
patients carrying MRSA. Of the 177 patients carrying MRSA, 144 (81%) were primary patients, and 33 (19%) secondary patients. The
average number of nosocomial transmissions was 6.7 per year. The cumulative incidence of MRSA colonization among this group of
patients was 0.10 cases per 100 admissions. Of 156 cases of MRSA colonization, 44 (28%) were acquired in a foreign healthcare institution,
and 45 (29%) were acquired in other Dutch hospitals, 22 (47%) of which were acquired in a single hospital in our region. There were 16
cases (10%) that occurred in a nursing home and another 16 cases (10%) that fulfilled our definition of community-acquired MRSA
colonization; there were 4 cases (3%) categorized as “other” and 31 cases (20%) for which the source of MRSA acquisition remained
unknown. The basic reproduction rate was 10-fold less for patients isolated on admission, compared with those who were not. During the
5-year study period, 5 episodes of MRSA bacteremia occurred in which 4 patients died, an incidence rate of 0.28 cases of infection per
100,000 patient-days per year.
conclusion. Our results show that, during a rigorous search and destroy policy, a low incidence of MRSA in our medical center was
continuously observed and that this policy most likely contributed to a very low nosocomial transmission rate.
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Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is an im-
portant cause of nosocomial and community-acquired in-
fections worldwide. In many countries, the percentage of
MRSA isolates recovered from patients in medical or nursing
centers has now reached 20%–50% of all clinical isolates of
S. aureus. The Netherlands and the Nordic European coun-
tries have so far succeeded in keeping the incidence of MRSA
infection or colonization low (approximately 1%).1 The secret
of this success is thought to be a combination of both re-
strictions on the prescription of antibiotics and implemen-
tation of a strict national prevention policy.2 In the Neth-
erlands, antibiotic pressure is low, compared with other
countries,3 and a search and destroy policy for the prevention
of MRSA infection or colonization was elaborated as a Dutch
national strategy by the Working Party on Infection Preven-
tion and has been in place since 1988.2 The measures de-
scribed in the policy were implemented in addition to the
universal standard precautions. The MRSA search and destroy
policy focuses on (1) defining groups at risk and screening
of both patients and healthcare workers (HCWs) at risk, (2)
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table 1. Risk Categories for Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) Carriage
Risk category Patients Healthcare workers
Category 1a Culture result positive for MRSA Culture result positive for MRSA
Category 2b Treated in foreign healthcare institution; transferred from
medical center with an outbreak of MRSA not brought
under control; had contact with an individual with
proven MRSA colonization or infection; an adopted
child from abroad
Unintentional unprotected contact with MRSA carrier;
treated or worked in foreign healthcare institution
Category 3c Not belonging to category 1 or 2 Not belonging to category 1 or 2
a Proven carriers of MRSA.
b High risk of carrying MRSA.
c No increased risk.
strict isolation of MRSA-positive patients and of patients con-
sidered to be at risk pending culture results, (3) outbreak
management, and, after hospital discharge, (4) follow-up of
carriers and (5) elimination of carriage if feasible. In our
study, we present the outcome associated with the search and
destroy policy in our hospital. We studied the effect of in-
fection control and outbreak management on incidence rates
for groups at risk and not at risk and on transmission rates
of MRSA, and we determined the sources and diversity of
MRSA strains.
methods
Setting, Design, and Participants
The Erasmus University Medical Center Rotterdam (here-
after referred to as Erasmus MC) is a 1,200-bed tertiary care
center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, with approximately
35,000 admissions, 311,000 patient-days, and 497,000 outpa-
tient visits yearly. The measures in the search and destroy
policy used by Erasmus MC are based on the national pol-
icy for MRSA from the Dutch Working Party on Infection
Prevention (2000–2004).2
The present study is a hospital-based observational cohort
study. We measured the cumulative incidence of MRSA in-
fection or colonization among patients and HCWs deemed
at risk according to criteria from the search and destroy poli-
cy and determined the number of persons who were infect-
ed or colonized with MRSA during their stay in the hospital.
The sources of MRSA infection or colonization, the geno-
types of MRSA, and the preventive effect of preemptive iso-
lation on transmission rates were determined. All of the pa-
tients who were admitted to the Erasmus MC during the
period from 2000 to 2004 and all of the HCWs who were in-
volved in their care were categorized into risk groups defined
in the search and destroy policy (Table 1).
Definitions
Primary cases were individuals with proven MRSA carriage
who acquired MRSA in either foreign healthcare institutions,
other Dutch healthcare institutions, or the community. It was
determined, either epidemiologically or by molecular typing
of their strain, that they did not become carriers via the
transmission of MRSA in our center. MRSA was considered
to be acquired in the community if the carrier, in the year
before detection, had not been admitted to or treated in any
healthcare facility. Secondary cases were individuals who were
infected or colonized as a result of the transmission of an
MRSA strain in the Erasmus MC as determined by epide-
miological and molecular typing data, who were admitted to
the same ward during the same period as the primary patient
(ie, the index patient), and who shared the same strain as
the primary patient.
The source of MRSA carriage was considered to be un-
known if, in the past, the patient had been admitted to a
healthcare center in the Netherlands that did not report an
outbreak or a single case of MRSA infection or colonization
with the same pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) type.
Individual healthcare centers other than Erasmus MC were
actively approached for documentation of the emergence of
defined PFGE types and outbreaks of MRSA infection in their
healthcare facilities.
Screening Cultures
Samples for active screening culture were obtained from risk
category 2 patients and HCWs. For patients, these samples
were obtained from the nose, throat, perineum, nonintact
skin, urine (in the case of urinary catheter use), drain fluid
(in the case of drain use), and/or exit sites (in the case of
drain and/or catheter use). The screening cultures of a single
person (case or HCW) are defined as a culture set. Isolation
of patients suspected of MRSA carriage was discontinued
when the culture set tested negative for MRSA. For HCWs,
samples for culture were obtained from the nose, throat, and,
if present, any skin lesions. This testing of samples obtained
from HCWs for culture does not require informed con-
sent, because this type of testing is part of the hospital MRSA
search and destroy policy, which is explained at the start
of employment.
Preventive Measures
From hospital admission onward, patients who were cate-
gorized as known carriers of MRSA (ie, category 1) or as
being at increased risk of carrying MRSA (ie, category 2)
were cared for in strict isolation in a single room with closed
door, preferably with an anteroom and regulated negative air
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figure 1. Working scheme after unexpected detection of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in nonisolated patients (A)
and after finding a secondary case (B). HCW, healthcare worker.
pressure in the patient room and anteroom. The attending
HCWs wore masks, gowns, gloves, and caps upon entering
the isolation room. Thorough disinfection of the hands with
alcohol-based hand rub was required after removing the
gloves, gown, mask, and cap. The room was disinfected twice
daily (chlorine 250 ppm). After an MRSA carrier was dis-
charged from the hospital, the isolation room was thoroughly
disinfected; all objects that could not be disinfected were
discarded. Patients were followed up after hospital discharge
and received decolonization treatment as soon as catheters,
drains, and/or wounds were no longer present. In short, de-
colonization was defined as a mupirocin and chlorhexidin
body wash; in case of extra nasal site colonization, 2 oral
antibiotics were also given. After decolonization treatment, 6
consecutive culture sets had to test negative for MRSA before
the patient could be considered free of MRSA colonization.
Up to that time, the patient remained in category 2, which
meant that strict isolation upon readmission to the hospital
or during outpatient clinic visits was required (see below).
HCWs who were known carriers of MRSA (ie, category 1)
were immediately furloughed from patient care and received
MRSA eradication treatment at once. They remained fur-
loughed until the first screening samples for culture, obtained
3 days after the end of eradication treatment, were found to
be negative. Thereafter, HCWs were tested for MRSA by cul-
ture once weekly. After 6 culture sets tested negative for
MRSA, the HCW was considered free of MRSA colonization,
and follow-up was discontinued. HCWs at increased risk of
MRSA carriage (ie, category 2) were allowed to work with-
out preventive measures but were screened once (eg, after
returning from work in a foreign healthcare institution) or
as long as the risk factor(s) remained present (Table 1).
Unexpected MRSA and Outbreak Management
Clinical culture samples unexpectedly yielding MRSA im-
mediately led to the initiation of a bundle of prevention and
screening measures if the patient (ie, the index patient) was
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figure 2. New findings of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) carriage among patients and healthcare workers (HCWs)
in Erasmus University Medical Center Rotterdam, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, during 2000–2004, per quarter. There were 177 patients
and 31 HCWs who tested positive for carrying MRSA. There were 144 (81%) of 177 patients and 12 (39%) of 31 HCWs who were
considered primary cases (ie, individuals with proven MRSA carriage who acquired MRSA in either foreign healthcare institutions, other
Dutch healthcare institutions, or the community). There were 33 (19%) of 177 patients and 19 (61%) of 31 HCWs who were considered
secondary cases (ie, individuals who were infected or colonized as a result of the transmission of an MRSA strain in our medical center
as determined by epidemiological and molecular typing data, who were admitted to the same ward during the same period as the primary
patient, and who shared the same strain as the primary patient).
figure 3. Origin of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) acquisition for 144 primary patients and 12 primary HCWs,
resulting in a total of 156 primary cases. Except for all cases occurring
in “Foreign healthcare institutions” and except for some cases oc-
curring in other “Dutch hospitals,” the sources of MRSA are not
proven, but the individuals are assumed to be at risk for acquiring
MRSA. “Foreign healthcare institutions” include both long-term care
and medical centers in foreign countries, “Dutch hospitals” include
all medical centers in the Netherlands except ours, “Dutch nursing
homes” include all long-term care facilities in the Netherlands, and
“other” refers to cases not belonging to one of the above-mentioned
healthcare facilities.
not already in strict isolation. The measures used after a sec-
ondary patient is found to be a carrier of MRSA are described
in Figure 1.
Data Collection
Data were collected from reports of the infection control
practitioners, laboratory reports, electronic charts, and med-
ical charts and by interviewing the staff on the wards with
MRSA carriers. The following data were systematically col-
lected: the number of screening cultures, their test results,
the source of MRSA for each new case, whether the case was
primary or secondary, whether preemptive isolation was ini-
tiated at admission for patients found to be in category 1 or
category 2, the number of wards closed, and the duration of
closure.
Microbiological Methods
MRSA screening swabs were first inoculated onto blood agar
plates (Becton Dickinson) and thereafter put into phenol red
mannitol enrichment broth containing 5 mg/L ceftizoxime
and 75 mg/L aztreonam.4 After 24 hr incubation at 35C, the
blood agar plates were checked for the growth ofx15 colony-
forming units of any bacterial species. If fewer colony-form-
ing units were present, the sampling was deemed to have
been insufficient, and a new swab was requested. After 48
hours of incubation, 1 loop (1 mL) of the broth was sub-
cultured onto a blood agar plate. Microbiological methods
to identify and type MRSA are described elsewhere.5
Data Analysis
Statistical analysis of the data was performed with Epi Info
software, version 2002 (Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention). Differences in frequencies were evaluated by use of
a x2 test. Basic reproduction rates were calculated. A P value
of less than .05 was considered to be statistically significant.
The 95% confidence intervals and the P values for differences
between groups were based on an exact Poisson test.
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figure 4. Effect of strict isolation on transmission of methicil-
lin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) by primary case patients
isolated after detection of MRSA carriage, compared with those
preemptively isolated on admission to our hospital in the Nether-
lands (2000–2004). The reproduction rate of MRSA was statistically
significantly lower for primary patients who were preemptively iso-
lated on admission, compared with the reproduction rate for pri-
mary patients who were isolated after MRSA was detected (P !
). A P value of less than .05 was considered to be statistically.001
significant. The 95% confidence intervals (CIs) and the P values for
differences between these groups of primary patients were based on
an exact Poisson test.
figure 5. Quarterly incidence rates of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) colonization among primary patients (np
) in our hospital in the Netherlands during 2000–2004. Nine strains were lost before typing. Five strains (Dutch pulsed-field type144
electrophoresis [PFGE] types of PFGE cluster numbers 15, 16, 18, 22, and 38) were more prevalent than other types (which we refer to
as sporadic types).
results
During the 5-year study period, 51,907 MRSA screening cul-
tures were performed for 21,598 persons (8,403 patients and
13,195 HCWs). By screening, it was determined that 123
(1.5%) of 8,403 patients and 31 (0.2%) of 13,195 HCWs were
MRSA carriers. From the performance of clinical cultures, it
was determined that 54 additional patients were MRSA car-
riers, resulting in a total of 177 patients carrying MRSA. The
cumulative incidence of MRSA colonization among this
group of patients was 0.10 cases per 100 admissions. The
cumulative incidence of MRSA colonization (detected by clin-
ical culture) among patients who were not at risk (ie, category
3) was 0.03 cases per 100 admissions. The cumulative inci-
dence of MRSA colonization (detected by surveillance cul-
ture) among patients at risk (ie, category 2) was 1.46 cases
per 100 admissions. Of the 177 patients carrying MRSA, 144
(81%) were primary cases, and 33 (19%) secondary cases.
The average number of nosocomial transmissions was 6.7 per
year. The number of primary cases varied from 2 to 12 cases
per quarter of a year (Figure 2). Three patients were known
to be MRSA carriers in the past but were thought to be free
of MRSA at the time of their readmission. Of the 144 primary
cases, 90 had not been isolated until detection of MRSA,
which warranted contact screening. Consequently, 142 con-
tact screening rounds were performed in 5 years.
Figure 3 shows the origin of MRSA acquisition for the 144
primary patients and the 12 primary HCWs, resulting in a
total of 156 primary cases. Of these 156 cases of MRSA col-
onization, 44 (28%) were acquired in a foreign healthcare
institution, and 45 (29%) were acquired in other Dutch hos-
pitals, 22 (47%) of which were acquired in a single hospital
(in our region) that experienced a major outbreak of MRSA
infection in 2002.6 There were 16 cases (10%) that occurred
in a nursing home and another 16 cases (10%) that fulfilled
our definition of community-acquired MRSA colonization;
there were 4 cases (3%) categorized as “other” and 31 cases
(20%) for which the source of MRSA acquisition remained
unknown. Of the 31 HCWs who were carriers, 19 (61%)
acquired MRSA during patient care in Erasmus MC, 2 (7%)
acquired MRSA by transmission in another Dutch healthcare
center, 5 (16%) acquired MRSA in a foreign healthcare in-
stitution, and 4 (13%) acquired MRSA in the community;
for 1 HCW (3%), the source of MRSA acquisition remained
unknown.
Figure 4 shows the effect of preemptive isolation on trans-
mission of MRSA. The diversity of PFGE types is given in
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table 2. Data on 13 Outbreaks of Methicillin-Resistant Staph-
ylococcus aureus (MRSA) Infection in Erasmus University Medical








Urology 19 1 HCW, 2 patients
2000
Gastroenterology 28 2 HCWs, 7 patients
2001
Pediatric ICU 12 2 HCWs
2001
ICU 6 3 patientsa
2002
General medicine 19 6 HCWs, 8 patients
2002b
Orthopedics 21 5 HCWs, 1 patient
Hemodialysis 13 …
2002
Cardiosurgery 20 1 HCW
2002
Gastroenterology 16 7 patients
2002
Gastroenterology 12 1 patient
2003
Pediatrics 11 2 patients
2003
General medicine ICU 13 1 patient
2004
Neurology ICU 16 1 HCW
2004
Pediatrics 14 1 HCW, 1 patient
Total 220 19 HCWs, 33 patients
a The primary patient died during admission to a single bedroom in the
intensive care unit (ICU). He was not known to be infected with MRSA;
therefore, his room was not disinfected after his death. However, after his
death, clinical culture yielded MRSA. The next patient admitted to the
same room was infected by the same strain, which was most likely trans-
mitted from the environment because contact screening of all other patients
and healthcare workers (HCWs) on the ICU yielded negative results. This
patient was dismissed from the ICU and transmitted MRSA to 2 other
patients in another ICU with open ward–style rooms before he was iden-
tified as carrying MRSA.
b The same strain was transmitted on 2 different wards. The index patient
was a patient who was transferred from another Dutch hospital. At the
time of transfer, the patient was not known to be at risk for MRSA infection
or colonization and was already transferred to the hemodialysis ward with-
out MRSA precautions before it turned out that he was MRSA positive.
Figure 5. Of the 52 secondary patients, 42 (81%) were infected
by 1 of the 5 most prevalent types, 52% of all strains belong
to 1 of those 5 types. In 122 unique strains, staphylococcal
cassette chromosome (SCC) mec type was determined. Type
I was seen in 22 (18%), type II in 8 (7%), type III in 13
(11%), and type IV in 42 strains (34%), and 28 strains (23%)
were untypable.
We had 13 outbreaks of MRSA infection in our hospital,
and we were able to define them as being epidemiologically
and molecularly linked via the transmission of the pathogen
among patients and HCWs (Table 2). Of the 13 outbreaks,
10 were by newly introduced, different strains, and 3 were
caused by persons with known MRSA infection or coloni-
zation in their history who were thought to be free of MRSA
and therefore were not isolated at readmission. Thirteen
wards had to be temporarily closed to prevent further MRSA
transmission. During the 5-year study period, 5 episodes of
MRSA bacteremia occurred in which 4 patients died, an in-
cidence rate of 0.28 cases of infection per 100,000 patient-
days per year.
discussion
We applied and still apply a strict MRSA search and destroy
policy at a large university medical center, and we have suc-
ceeded in maintaining a very low incidence of MRSA colo-
nization and infection in the face of increasing rates of col-
onization and infection in other parts of the world. The use
of preemptive isolation decreased the basic reproductive rate
of MRSA by nearly 10-fold. Other Dutch medical centers
show comparable results.7
Because this was not a randomized controlled study, the
precise effect of the search and destroy policy could not be
exactly defined but only deduced from years of implemen-
tation of the policy, together with years of low incidence of
MRSA colonization and infection, which leads us to conclude
that this policy is justified and effective. Other countries or
hospitals that do not yet have this policy in place but intend
to do so should perform such a study. However, the low
numbers of nosocomial transmission (ie, secondary cases) is
quite likely to be due to the search and destroy policy. The
effect of the search and destroy policy should be taken as the
effect of a bundle of preventive measures, of which the in-
dividual contribution of each measure of the policy cannot
be quantified separately. However, we believe that to control
the spread of MRSA infection or colonization requires the
use of multiple simultaneous interventions, because there are
multiple potential sources of MRSA infection or coloniza-
tion (ie, the patient, the HCWs, and the environment) and
multiple routes of transmission. Only by addressing these mul-
tiple sources and routes can one maintain or obtain low levels
of MRSA endemicity. The MRSA search and destroy policy is
a national policy, which had led to the discovery of the observed
genetic diversity of MRSA strains in the Netherlands. Because
secondary transmission, and thus clonal spread, is not frequent,
individual genotypes will not dominate the population of pa-
tients with MRSA infection or colonization in the Netherlands.
Of the 177 patients who carried MRSA, 85 (48%) were carriers
of MRSA strains with distinct PFGE types that varied, and 92
(52%) were carriers of 1 of 5 predominant strains; all of these
strains were involved in a large outbreak in a nearby hospital.6
In 2002 (the period when a large outbreak occurred in a nearby
hospital; ie, 1 [20%] of the 5 years of the study period), 18
(55%) of the 33 secondary patients and 15 (79%) of the 19
secondary HCWs were identified. Because of the identification
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of the secondary patients as MRSA carriers and their subse-
quent isolation on readmission, we only experienced 3 out-
breaks related to the recurrence of an already known MRSA
genotype.
We only actively screened patients and HCWs at increased
risk of carrying MRSA, which we felt was justified because
of the low incidence of MRSA carriage among patients at risk
and the prevalence of MRSA carriage found in the commu-
nity in the Netherlands.8 Furthermore, we determined that
the cumulative incidence of MRSA carriage among patients
screened because of an increased risk of MRSA carriage (ie,
category 2) was 49-fold higher than it was among patients
not deemed to be at risk. However, the latter incidence data
can be an underestimate, because not all patients admitted
to the hospital were actively screened or clinically tested for
MRSA on culture. As soon as an MRSA carrier is identified,
strict isolation procedures are implemented to limit further
transmission. Jernigan et al9 estimated the rate of MRSA
transmission by a carrier who was not isolated (contact iso-
lation) to be 14 cases per 1,000 patient-days, which is 16-
fold higher than the rate of transmission when contact iso-
lation is used. During the study period, we detected 123
(primary and secondary) patients with MRSA carriage who
were not isolated for at least part of their stay in the hospital;
at the time of detection, 52 (42%) of these 123 patients were
considered to be at increased risk of carrying MRSA (ie,
category 2). Isolation at admission was associated with a very
low MRSA reproductive rate of 5.5%, which is 10-fold lower
than the reproductive rate when isolation is not started at
admission. The rate of MRSA transmission among noniso-
lated patients was much higher than that among isolated
patients, but it was limited by the immediate implementa-
tion of isolation when MRSA was detected. Bootsma et al10
have calculated in their mathematical model that the isola-
tion of MRSA carriers and the screening and isolation of
patients belonging to certain risk categories may successful-
ly decrease a high incidence or retain a low incidence of MRSA
infection or colonization. This prediction was confirmed by
our observations.
The strategy of preemptive isolation and screening has had
a considerable impact on the decrease in days of exposure to
MRSA. The proportion of patients detected by screening (123
[69%] of 177) is comparable to the proportions described
elsewhere.11-13 Harbarth et al14 found that 55 (77%) of 71
MRSA carriers would have been missed if screening cultures
were not performed. Salgado and Farr11 found that relying
only on clinical microbiological cultures would have failed to
identify 85% of their MRSA-colonized patients. Colonization
with methicillin-susceptible S. aureus is a risk factor for in-
fections such as bacteremia or surgical site infection. This
likely also holds true for colonization with MRSA.15,16 A low
threshold for screening of patients and the use of sensitive
laboratory methods ensured that the majority of MRSA-col-
onized persons were identified and were not just “the tip of
the iceberg.” The low incidence rate of MRSA bacteremia
(0.28 cases per 100,000 patient-days) is in agreement with
the previous statement. In the European Antimicrobial Re-
sistance Surveillance System report of 2004, the incidence
rate of MRSA bacteremia in the Netherlands was 0.35 cases
per 100,000 patient-days (95% confidence interval, 0.2–0.7
cases per 100,000 patient-days). The median incidence rate
of MRSA bacteremia in Europe was 3.93 cases per 100,000
patient-days, which is 14 times higher than the median in-
cidence rate of MRSA bacteremia in our center.17
Recently, 2 interesting studies were published concerning
the fight against MRSA infection or colonization. Harbarth
et al18 had to conclude that their universal, rapid MRSA ad-
mission screening strategy did not reduce the rate of noso-
comial MRSA infection. Robicsek et al19 initiated universal
active surveillance and decolonization and reported a 70%
reduction in MRSA disease. However, there were differences
between our policy and the policy of Harbarth et al.18 In their
policy, patients who were admitted to the hospital for less
than 24 hours were not screened, even if they were at high
risk for MRSA carriage. Also, there was no screening of in-
patients to detect MRSA or isolate newly colonized patients,
and the screening of HCWs was even not mentioned.20 To
achieve lower rates of MRSA infection with the use of their
policy, the other potential reservoirs of MRSA in hospitals,
especially HCWs, will need to be addressed.
Years of use of a strict MRSA search and destroy policy in
the Netherlands has coincided with a low prevalence of MRSA
infection or colonization. However, Tiemersma et al1 reported
a significant 3-fold increase in rates of MRSA infection or
colonization in the Netherlands in 2002, compared with the
years before. An explanation for this increase could be (1)
reporting bias, because, at that time, the reference laboratory
(ie, the National Institute for Public Health and the Envi-
ronment) introduced a national PFGE-typing program that
directed laboratories to send their strains in, (2) the national
introduction of a more sensitive culture method using en-
richment broth,4 or (3) the large outbreak of MRSA infec-
tion that occurred that year in a hospital in our region, with
many unidentified carriers being admitted to other medi-
cal centers.6,21
Threats to the low incidence of MRSA infection or colo-
nization in any hospital are admission of cases of community-
acquired MRSA infection and/or cases of MRSA infection
resulting from transmission in a nursing home; both types
of cases of infection were the sources of MRSA carriage in
10% of all primary cases of MRSA carriage in our hospital.
There was only 1 case of community-acquired MRSA colo-
nization with SCCmec type IV.
The cornerstone of the MRSA search and destroy policy
is preventive isolation of high-risk patients before their
MRSA carriage is even substantiated. Our results show that
one-third of the primary cases acquired their MRSA in a
foreign healthcare institution and thus were grouped cor-
rectly into 1 of the 2 risk categories. However, 90 (62.5%)
of 144 primary patients were not isolated at the time of
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hospital admission, and 9 (10%) of these 90 patients caused
the transmission of MRSA in our medical center. Therefore,
research must be continued to identify newly emerging risk
factors or to identify groups of patients in the community as
belonging to category 2.
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